Pennsylvania DUI Attorney
Reasonable Suspicion
Both Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Security from Searches and Seizures, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, protect motorists in the Commonwealth from unwarranted seizures by law enforcement officials. Commonwealth v. Petroll, 558 Pa. 565, 738 A.2d 993, 998 (1999).
In order to stop a car, a police officer must have "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of [the Vehicle Code]" to effectuate a vehicle stop. 75 Pa.C.S. sec. 6308, amended by 2003 Pa. Laws 24, sec. 17 (effective Feb. 1, 2004). The interpretation of "articulable and reasonable grounds" is the equivalent of "probable cause," requiring police have probable cause to believe the vehicle or its driver was in violation of the Vehicle Code. Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111, 785 A.2d 983, 986 (2001); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 668 A.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1995).
The statute, 75 Pa.C.S. section 6308(b), states:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in
a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable
suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred,
he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility,
vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's license,
or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures. In the Interest of D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The key question in determining if a seizure is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment is if it is reasonable. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990).
As provided for by statute, anytime a police officer has "reasonable suspicion" to believe a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is occurring or has occurred, the officer may initiate an investigatory vehicle stop. 75 Pa.C.S. sec. 6308; See also Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1242 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 686, 934 A.2d 72 (Pa.2007).
Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is able to articulate specific observations which, when considered with reasonable inferences derived therefrom, lead to a reasonable conclusion, in light of the officer's experience, that criminal activity is afoot and the person seized was engaged in the criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 686, 934 A.2d 72 (Pa.2007).
A court considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify an investigatory traffic stop. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 686, 934 A.2d 72 (Pa.2007).
The proper standard to be applied in determining the legality of the traffic stop is whether the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code were being violated. See 75 Pa.C.S. sec. 6308(b); Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2006).
In order to determine whether the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In the Interest of D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 449, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001).
The totality of the circumstances does not limit inquiry to an examination of only those facts which clearly indicate criminal conduct but also includes a consideration of whether a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, warrant further investigation by the police officer. Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 676-77 (1999). In making this determination, due weight must be given to the specific reasonable inferences which the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his or her experience. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 933 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Furtive movements and nervousness, standing alone, do not support the existence of reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1206 (Pa.Super.2002) (en banc) ("we find no basis to conclude that excessive nervousness and furtive movements, even considered together, give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity").