Pennsylvania DUI Attorney
Jurisdiction
Officer participating in checkpoint for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) outside his jurisdiction was not authorized to make an arrest, as there was no evidence that request for officer\'s assistance was made by an authorized officer, or that officer was authorized to conduct official business outside his jurisdiction at the time of arrest. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 948 A.2d 189 (Pa.Cmwlth.,2008).
In Martin v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 588 Pa. 429, 905 A.2d 438 (2006), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a municipal officer acting outside of his jurisdiction, without statutory authority, was without authority to implement the implied consent warnings.
In McKinley v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 576 Pa. 85, 94, 838 A.2d 700, 706 (2003), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a police officer acting outside of his jurisdiction lacked the ability to act as a police officer and would not be treated as such.
Officer had violated the MPJA when he pursued the motorist into the adjoining jurisdiction on the suspicion of speeding because he did not have probable cause to suspect a crime had been committed in his own jurisdiction. The Court noted the officer was not in the adjoining jurisdiction on "official business," such as a routine incursion into another jurisdiction to turn around to return to his regular patrol route, but, rather, had entered the adjoining jurisdiction solely for the purpose of investigating his suspicion that the motorist was speeding. Martin v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 588 Pa. 429, 905 A.2d 438, 447-48 (2006).
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 582 Pa. 200, 870 A.2d 818, 821 (2005) ("[W]e are led to the following rule: section 8953(a)(5) of the MPJA authorizes an extrajurisdictional detention where the detaining officer is on-duty, outside his or her jurisdiction for a routine customary reason including responding to an exigent circumstance, develops probable cause to believe an offense has been committed, and limits out-of-jurisdiction activities to maintaining the status quo, including detaining the suspect, until officers from the appropriate jurisdiction arrive.")
Police officer's suspicion that driver of vehicle was the vehicle's registered owner whose license had been suspended, though reasonable as to justify a stop within his own primary jurisdiction, did not rise to the level of probable cause necessary to pursue vehicle outside officer's primary jurisdiction, under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (MPJA). However, this "relatively minor infraction" of the MPJA did not require suppression of evidence resulting from the stop. One of the principal purposes of the MPJA is to promote public safety while placing a general limitation on extraterritorial police patrols; it is in the interest of promoting public safety, that the MPJA exceptions contemplate and condone extra-territorial activity in response to specifically identified criminal behavior that occurs within the primary jurisdiction of the police. Commonwealth. v. Hillier, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa.Super.,2008). See also Commonwealth v. Lehman, 582 Pa. 200, 870 A.2d 818, 820 (2005); Commonwealth v. Peters, 915 A.2d 1213 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal granted, --- Pa. ----, 938 A.2d 988 (2007).
Police officer's violation of Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (MPJA), in initiating a traffic stop of defendant, who had run a red light, and then arresting defendant after he failed a breath test and a series of field tests, did not warrant application of exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained; officer was on routine patrol when he determined he had probable cause to initiate traffic stop, he did not enter State police's jurisdiction to embark on a fishing expedition, and officer's failure to follow proper procedure and detain defendant until officers from the appropriate jurisdiction arrived did not prejudice defendant. Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967 (Pa.Super.,2008).
In Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 523 Pa. 384, 567 A.2d 1023 (Pa.1989), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
In Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396,
490 A.2d 421 (1985), we held that suppression of evidence was an
inappropriate remedy for a violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
relating to the issuance and execution of a search warrant outside of a
police officer's primary jurisdiction where said violation did not
implicate fundamental, constitutional concerns, was not conducted in
bad faith or did not substantially prejudice the accused in the sense
that the search would not otherwise have occurred or would not have
been as intrusive. Automatic exclusion of evidence obtained by searches
accompanied by relatively minor infractions of the rules of criminal
procedure would be a remedy out of all proportion to the violation, or
to the benefits gained to the end of obtaining justice while preserving
individual liberties.
Id. at 1221 (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 455 Pa.Super. 76, 686 A.2d 1353, 1354 (1996) (stating, "We hold that when an officer activates his emergency lights and initiates a stop of a vehicle within his primary jurisdiction, the fact that the vehicle eventually comes to rest beyond the limits of the officer's jurisdiction does not establish a violation of the Statewide Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act. This is so even when the stop was initiated based upon a reasonable suspicion of a violation, rather than based upon probable cause.").