Pennsylvania DUI Attorney
In Commonwealth v. Kriston, 527 Pa. 90, 588 A.2d 898 (1991), the Supreme Court addressed whether time spent in an electronic home monitoring program should be counted towards a mandatory minimum sentence imposed pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731 for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Court stated:
We believe it would grossly distort the
language used by the legislature if we were to conclude that the term
"imprisonment" means merely "staying at home." The plain and ordinary
meaning of imprisonment is confinement in a correctional or similar
rehabilitative institution, not staying at home. The qualitative
differences in treatment experienced by one who is confined in an
institution, as opposed to one who merely stays at home, are too
numerous and obvious to require elaboration. The legislature would not
have intended that its use of the term "imprisonment" would be so
diluted in effect as to encompass home monitoring programs.
Id. at 94, 588 A.2d at 899-900 (footnote omitted). In concluding that "a mandatory sentence of imprisonment is to be carried out through actual imprisonment in an institutional setting rather than through lesser means [,]" Id. at 96, 588 A.2d at 900, the Court added that it "cannot intrude into the legislative realm to deal with the problem [of a heavily overcrowded prison system], by upholding home monitoring as a means of serving mandatory minimum sentences, where doing so would mean ignoring the plain language of legislation requiring ‘imprisonment’ of offenders." Id. at 96, 588 A.2d at 901 (footnote omitted).